That There Might Be Madness In Thinking

Michael Foucault and Woke Mental Illness

James Lindsay (9/11/26)

Surely you have noticed a couple of things about Woke. First, it acts like mental illness. Second, it actually valorizes mental illness for real. These outcomes are the logical consequence of having adopted the views of the postmodernist Michel Foucault, particularly his early work in Madness and Civilization (1961). Among the consequences to this civilizational catastrophe, besides the obvious, including the transgender ideological craze, is the complete destruction of anything like a “reasonable person” standard by which to judge things we see happening in the world. In this episode of New Discourses Bullets, host James Lindsay explains this intellectual history and its relevance to so much of what we deal with today.

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Sometimes I’m convinced the purpose of modern culture, everything we experience in the present moment, the purpose of culture today more in the distraction-rather-than – confrontation – business. In effect, the route of what the great media scholar Neil Postman identified in his famous book about media titled the same thing it argued in book title Amusing Ourselves to Death. It was a powerful, original statement about the modern state of control and how it controls by distraction and other amusements culture can offer. 

In effect, distraction of the populace much better than direct confrontation of them. The modern creed of American power. A creed that units both parties together when nothing else does. Their mutual agreement that whoever in power, work for distraction of the populace must go on.

The greatest advertiser in the world. The inventor of advertising and modern PR. One might suggest this power over Americans comes from the interplay of the so-called distribution of “amusement or entertainment” to the populace. A creed that units both parties together when nothing else does. Distraction by amusement away from attention in the presence of reality. There are different states of mind in the world and one of the most brilliant 15 minutes I’ve ever heard is by An entire state of mind 

Over what percentage of the America population does this distraction hold power over? What percentage hold out from most of society?

* * *

I guess an introduction to a person I’ve been reading and listening to for years, James Lindsay. He and two other academics were famous for writing fake articles to prestigious journals around the globe. And getting their article published. But I’ve always been behind his battles with the “academic” world. The below post is from his regular post you can sign up below for free. It’s significant it was written on September 11, 2026. It explains much about the reason and philosophy behind Woke today. Worth a listen. Not sure if a continuing series but one of the most interesting posts and dialogues I’ve heard on the Internet so far. 

___________________________

I thought about all of what he said above. James Lindsay creating some very interesting one of those true moments of reflection on something away from al the distraction of culture today. 

I composed the question below. My AI agent considers the below question and lets me see the inside thinking of my AI agent. Consideration (in italics) and answer (regular text) from my AI agent below.

We need answer. User asks: “What about unreason that results in murder and hurting people?” They refer to Foucault Madness and Civilization. Need discuss. Need likely explain Foucault doesn’t deny violence; but challenges framing. Need maybe distinguish unreason, madness, dangerousness, crime, psychiatry, law, moral treatment, confinement. We need answer likely: Foucault’s critique not romanticizing madness or saying all unreason harmless. The question: What about unreason that results in murder and hurting people? Need address: In M&C, Foucault discusses cases? There is discussion of “madness” and crime? He mentions in Renaissance, madness linked to death, crime? In classical age, confinement includes mad, criminals? Actually Hôpital Général included poor, vagabonds, prostitutes, blasphemers, etc. Not necessarily murderers. The “mad” who were dangerous? Foucault’s argument: psychiatry often justifies confinement by dangerousness, but dangerousness is not self-evident; it’s constructed. Need maybe mention the problem of violent madness is real, but Foucault’s point is about how society responds: Does it treat as medical problem? Does it silence? Does it use power? We should be careful not to dismiss victims. We can say Foucault does not offer a policy for acute violent psychosis; his work is historical-philosophical, not clinical ethics. He would ask: How did we come to define certain violent acts as symptoms of mental illness? What functions does that serve? Does it allow us to avoid listening to the meaning of the act? He might argue that to call it “unreason” and confine is to avoid dialogue. But that doesn’t mean no response is needed. We can discuss tension: If someone is actively dangerous, society must intervene. Foucault’s critique doesn’t say “let them roam.” It says be suspicious of the asylum’s claim to neutral benevolence, and of the equation of madness with danger. The “moral treatment” replaced chains with guilt and surveillance; modern psychiatry/legal system still uses dangerousness to justify coercive power. We can mention “monomania” in 19th century: a diagnosis for homicidal insanity without delirium, used in famous cases like Henriette Cornier? Foucault discusses “monomania” in later lectures? In M&C? I think he mentions “homicidal monomania” maybe in “The Birth of the Asylum” or in “Madness and Civilization” chapter? There’s a section on “The New Division” maybe? Actually Foucault discusses “homicidal monomania” in “Madness and Civilization”? I recall in Part III? He talks about “madness and crime” in the classical age? There is “The Madman in the Garden of Species”? Hmm. In M&C, there is a chapter “The Great Confinement” and “The Birth of the Asylum”. He mentions “the madman is not a criminal” etc. There’s also “The New Division” where he discusses the fear of madness in the 19th century, and “homicidal monomania” as a new category. Yes, in “Madness and Civilization”, chapter “The New Division” maybe: “The crime of the madman” and “monomania” discussed. He says monomania was a way to make madness responsible? Actually let’s recall: In 19th century, psychiatry invented “monomania” (partial insanity) to explain crimes that seemed rational but were insane. This allowed psychiatry to enter legal domain. Foucault’s point: psychiatry expands its power by claiming to detect dangerousness even without visible madness. The madman becomes a permanent threat. The asylum becomes a place to manage dangerousness. This is relevant. So we can answer: Foucault would say the question of violent unreason is exactly where psychiatry’s power is most justified and most dangerous. It is justified because society must protect people. It is dangerous because it can conflate dissent, difference, moral judgment with pathology, and it silences the subject. The task is to maintain tension: take violence seriously, but not let the category of “unreason” become a blank check for coercive control. Need maybe mention that Foucault doesn’t deny the reality of mental suffering or violence. He is not a romantic of madness. In fact, he says in preface? “We have yet to write the history of that other form of madness…” He doesn’t say madmen are wise. He critiques the silence. So we can say: If a person kills due to psychosis, that is a tragedy. Foucault’s analysis doesn’t erase the harm. It asks: What are the conditions under which we respond? Do we respond therapeutically, punitively, both? Who decides? What is the voice of the person? Are we treating them as a subject or an object? The modern system often does both: medical and penal. Foucault’s concept of “disciplinary power” and “biopower” later. In M&C, the asylum is a moral and social institution. The violent act may be real, but the label “unreason” is a social judgment. Need maybe mention that “unreason” in Foucault is not simply “irrational violence.” It’s a historical category. In Renaissance, unreason had a cosmic dimension; in classical age, it was confined with idleness and moral disorder; in modern, it’s mental illness. Violent acts are part of the empirical phenomena, but Foucault’s focus is on the discursive practices that categorize them.

We should structure answer:

• Acknowledge the hard question: real violence, murder, harm. Foucault doesn’t ignore it, but his book isn’t a clinical manual.
• Foucault’s key move: “dangerousness” is not a natural fact but a category used to justify confinement. In 19th century, “homicidal monomania” allowed psychiatry to claim expertise over crimes without obvious delusion. This expanded psychiatric power into law.
• The asylum’s “moral treatment” was about making the madman responsible and guilty, not just protecting others. Pinel/Tuke: chains replaced by shame, surveillance, judgment.
• So Foucault would ask: When we say “unreason that murders,” what are we doing? Are we treating the act as a symptom to be managed, or as a meaningful act to be understood? Are we protecting potential victims? Are we also silencing the person? Are we conflating dangerousness with difference?
• But: Foucault’s critique does not entail that violent psychosis should be ignored or that coercion is never justified. He doesn’t provide a normative theory of when to intervene. Critics say this is a weakness: his radical critique can leave no clear ground for protecting victims or for distinguishing between oppressive confinement and necessary care. We can note that.
• Practical takeaway: A Foucauldian approach would favor minimal coercion, legal safeguards, listening to the subject, treating violence as a problem of the whole person in context, not just an essence called “madness.” It would be suspicious of preventive detention based on psychiatric prediction. It would insist on rights and on not reducing the person to their diagnosis. But it would not deny that some people are dangerous and need containment, sometimes against their will.
• Maybe mention that Foucault later in “The Birth of the Asylum” and lectures “Psychiatric Power” develops these themes. In “Abnormal” lectures, he discusses dangerous individual, criminal psychiatry. But user asked about M&C. We can mention later work.
• We can conclude: The question of violent unreason is the limit case. Foucault forces us to ask not only “how do we protect people?” but also “what kind of power are we authorizing in the name of protection?” Both questions matter.

Need maybe answer directly: “What about unreason that results in murder and hurting people?” Could say: Foucault would not say it’s harmless or romantic. He would say the fact that some madness is violent is precisely what makes the asylum’s power seem necessary. But the book shows that the response to madness has never been purely about safety; it has been about reason’s self-definition, moral judgment, and social exclusion. So we need to separate: (1) the reality of harm, (2) the social construction of dangerousness, (3) the ethics of intervention. Foucault helps with 2 and 3, not 1. He doesn’t offer clinical solutions. He warns against letting the category of unreason become a blank check. But we still need to protect people.

Maybe mention specific historical example: In M&C, Foucault discusses the case of “the madman who killed” maybe? I recall he mentions “the case of the soldier” or “the man who killed his wife”? Not sure. But we can mention “monomania” as the 19th-century invention. Let’s verify: In Madness and Civilization, Part III, chapter 4? “The New Division” maybe. He discusses “homicidal monomania” and the case of Henriette Cornier, a servant who killed a child in 1825. Foucault mentions in “Abnormal” lectures. In M&C, he mentions “the crime of the madman” and “the legend of the chain” maybe. But safe to say: Foucault shows that 19th-century psychiatry invented categories like “homicidal monomania” to claim authority over dangerous individuals who seemed rational. That is relevant.

We should be careful not to overstate Foucault’s view on violence. He doesn’t say violence is just a label. He says the experience of madness is silenced. But he doesn’t deny the reality of the phenomenon. We can say: For Foucault, the problem is not that we respond to violence; it’s how we respond and what we authorize in doing so. He would ask: Does the response restore dialogue and rights, or does it deepen exclusion? Does it treat the person as a subject of a life, or as an object of a diagnosis? Does it protect potential victims without turning psychiatry into a police force? These are hard questions. Foucault doesn’t answer them fully. That’s a fair criticism.

Maybe we can also mention that Foucault’s own position is often accused of relativism or romanticizing madness. But he explicitly says in the preface to the 1961 edition? “We are not trying to write a history of psychiatric knowledge, but the history of the conditions of possibility of that knowledge.” He doesn’t say madmen are right. He says they are silenced. So violent unreason is a limit case that tests his critique. If we take his critique seriously, we must not abandon the need for safety, but we must be vigilant about the power we grant to define and confine.

We can structure:

1. The short answer: Foucault doesn’t deny violent unreason; he shifts the question from “how do we cure/contain it?” to “how did we come to define it, and what power does that definition authorize?”
2. The historical mechanism: dangerousness and monomania. Psychiatry gained power by claiming to detect dangerous madness even in seemingly rational acts. This made the madman a permanent threat.
3. The asylum: moral treatment replaced chains with guilt and surveillance. The violent act becomes proof of need for total control.
4. The ethical tension: real harm vs. social construction. We must protect victims. But we must ask whether coercive psychiatry is the only or best response. Foucault doesn’t give a policy; he gives a critical lens.
5. Criticism: His approach can seem to leave no room for acknowledging genuine danger. That’s a valid critique. A balanced Foucauldian view: take violence seriously, minimize coercion, maximize rights, listen to the person, avoid reducing them to a diagnosis, and be transparent about the power being exercised.

We can also mention that “unreason” in Foucault is not just individual violence; it’s a historical category that includes the mad, the poor, the criminal, the vagabond. So when we ask about murder, we are asking about the edge of that category. The classical age confined them together, not because they were all dangerous, but because they were all “unreasonable” in the sense of not fitting the bourgeois order of labor and reason. So the dangerous madman is a later, more specific figure. That might be useful.

We should keep answer accessible, not too long, but thorough. Desired oververbosity 5. We can write maybe 600-900 words. We can use headings. We should be clear that Foucault’s book is not a denial of violence. We can say: “The question is fair, and it’s the strongest objection to Foucault.” Then explain.

We can also mention that Foucault later in “Discipline and Punish” and “The History of Sexuality” develops power, but in M&C the asylum is a proto-disciplinary institution. The violent madman is the ultimate justification for asylum. But Foucault shows that the asylum also served to impose bourgeois morality. So the answer: We must not let the reality of violence become a justification for unlimited power. But we also cannot ignore it. Foucault helps us see the difference between necessary protection and oppressive confinement. He doesn’t solve it.

Maybe we can quote? “Madness is the absence of work” in classical age? Not necessary. We can quote “The madman is not the man who has lost his reason; he is the man whose reason is not his own” or something? Not sure. Better not quote unless certain. We can paraphrase.

Let’s draft:

Start: That’s the hardest question for Madness and Civilization. Foucault is often read as romanticizing unreason, but he doesn’t deny that some mad people kill or hurt. He denies that “unreason” is a natural medical entity and that the asylum is a neutral response. So if someone murders in psychosis, Foucault would say: the harm is real; the question is what we do with it.

Then: In M&C, the dangerous madman is not the primary figure of the Renaissance or classical confinement. The classical age confined the idle, poor, blasphemous, venereal, etc. The dangerous madman becomes central in the 19th century with “moral treatment” and “monomania.” Psychiatry invented partial insanity to explain crimes that seemed rational. This let doctors say: even if you seem sane, you may be dangerous. That expanded psychiatric power into courts and prisons. So the category “unreason that murders” is historically produced. It is not just discovered.

Then: The asylum response: Pinel and Tuke replaced chains with surveillance, guilt, and judgment. The violent act becomes proof that the madman must be constantly watched. The doctor’s authority is absolute. Foucault’s point: this is not just protection; it is a moral project. It makes the madman responsible for his madness. It silences him.

Then: So what about real violence? Foucault doesn’t offer a clinical ethics. He would ask:

• Is the violence a symptom, a communication, a social situation, or all three?
• What does calling it “unreason” do? Does it protect others, or does it also protect us from listening?
• Who gets to decide dangerousness? How reliable are psychiatric predictions?
• Are we treating the person as a subject with rights, or as an object of security?
• Could we respond with minimal coercion, legal safeguards, and care, rather than permanent exclusion?

Then: Criticism: His critique can seem to leave no room for the obvious fact that some people are dangerous and need containment. That’s a fair objection. Foucault is better at diagnosing power than prescribing policy. A balanced view: take violence seriously, protect victims, but be suspicious of any system that uses “madness” as a blank check for coercion. The goal is not to abolish psychiatry but to make its power visible and accountable.

Then: Conclusion: For Foucault, the violent madman is the limit case that makes the asylum seem necessary. The task is to hold two truths: some unreason is genuinely destructive, and the response to it is never purely medical or neutral. It is always moral, legal, and political. Foucault forces us to ask both “how do we keep people safe?” and “what kind of power are we willing to authorize in the name of safety?” He doesn’t answer the first, but he makes the second unavoidable.

We can also mention that Foucault later in “The Dangerous Individual” (lecture) discusses exactly this. In “Abnormal” lectures, he traces how psychiatry became a science of dangerousness. We can mention that as further reading.

We should ensure we answer the user’s question directly. They ask “What about unreason that results in murder and hurting people?” So we should not just summarize book. We should address the tension. We can say: Foucault would not say it’s not a problem. He would say the problem is not just the act but the way society uses the act to justify confinement and to define reason. But we still need to protect people. So the answer is nuanced.

We can maybe include a caveat: Foucault’s own personal politics? Not needed.

Let’s write in clear, engaging style. Use headings. Maybe 4-5 sections. Keep it around 700-900 words. We can use bullet points. Ensure we don’t overclaim. We can say “Foucault doesn’t deny” but we should be careful: he doesn’t explicitly discuss murder much in M&C? He does discuss monomania. So it’s okay to infer.

Let’s produce final.

* * *

That’s the hardest question to put to Madness and Civilization—and it’s the one that keeps Foucault from being a simple romantic of unreason. Foucault does not deny that some people in states we call madness kill or hurt others. What he denies is that “unreason” is a natural, self-evident medical entity, and that the asylum’s response to it is neutral, benevolent, or purely about safety.

So the short answer is: the harm is real, but the category “unreason that murders” is historical, and the power we authorize in the name of protecting people is the real Foucauldian problem.

The dangerous madman is a relatively late figure

In the Renaissance and classical age, Foucault argues, madness was not primarily defined by dangerousness. The Great Confinement herded together the poor, vagabonds, prostitutes, blasphemers, and the mad—not because they were all violent, but because they were “unreasonable” in the sense of not fitting the bourgeois order of work, reason, and morality.

The figure of the dangerous madman becomes central in the 19th century. Psychiatry invented categories like “homicidal monomania”—a madness that could supposedly produce a terrible crime without any obvious delusion. This allowed doctors to claim expertise over crimes that looked rational. Suddenly, psychiatry could say: You may seem sane, but you are secretly dangerous. That expanded psychiatric power into courts, prisons, and everyday life. Foucault’s point is not that such crimes never happen; it’s that the category was constructed in a way that gave psychiatry enormous authority.

The asylum’s answer: chains replaced by guilt and surveillance

Foucault famously challenges the story that Pinel and Tuke “liberated” the mad by removing their chains. In his account, they replaced iron chains with invisible moral chains: constant observation, judgment, shame, and forced self-surveillance. The violent act became proof that the madman needed total control. The doctor’s authority became absolute. Madness was no longer a cosmic dialogue with unreason; it was a moral failing to be corrected, a disease to be managed, a danger to be contained.

So when someone kills or hurts in a state of unreason, Foucault would ask:

• Is the act being treated as a symptom to be managed, or as a meaningful act to be understood?
• Does calling it “unreason” protect others, or does it also protect us from listening to the person?
• Who gets to decide dangerousness, and how reliable are psychiatric predictions?
• Are we responding with care and legal safeguards, or with permanent exclusion and moral condemnation?

Foucault doesn’t offer a clinical ethics

This is the fair criticism. Madness and Civilization is a history of power and knowledge, not a policy manual for acute psychosis. Foucault is better at showing how the asylum’s power works than at telling us when coercion is justified. He doesn’t say: “Let violent madmen roam free.” He says: Be suspicious of the claim that the asylum is simply protecting you. The asylum also defines reason, enforces morality, and silences the mad.

A balanced Foucauldian view would hold two truths at once:

1. Some unreason is genuinely destructive. Victims matter. Safety matters. Coercion is sometimes necessary.
2. The response to that destruction is never purely medical or neutral. It is always legal, moral, and political. It can protect, but it can also oppress.

Foucault later developed this theme in lectures like Abnormal and Psychiatric Power, where he traces how psychiatry became a science of dangerousness—a way to manage risky individuals before they act. That is the limit case of his critique: the more we justify power by danger, the more we risk turning psychiatry into a police force.

So the answer to your question is not “Foucault ignores violence.” It’s that he forces us to ask both: How do we keep people safe? and What kind of power are we willing to authorize in the name of safety? He doesn’t answer the first. But he makes the second impossible to ignore.

* * *

In effect, distraction of the populace much better than direct confrontation of them. The modern creed of American power. A creed that units both parties together when nothing else does. Their mutual agreement that whoever in power, work for distraction of the populace must go on.

The greatest advertiser in the world. The inventor of advertising and modern PR. One might suggest this power over Americans comes from the interplay of the so-called distribution of “amusement or entertainment” to the populace. A creed that units both parties together when nothing else does. Distraction by amusement away from attention in the presence of reality. There are different states of mind in the world and one of the most brilliant 15 minutes I’ve ever heard is by An entire state of mind 

Over what percentage of the America population does this distraction hold power over? What percentage hold out from most of society?

* * *

I guess an introduction to a person I’ve been reading and listening to for years, James Lindsay. He and two other academics were famous for writing fake articles to prestigious journals around the globe. And getting their article published. But I’ve always been behind his battles with the “academic” world. The below post is from his regular post you can sign up below for free. It’s significant it was written on September 11, 2026. It explains much about the reason and philosophy behind Woke today. Worth a listen. Not sure if a continuing series but one of the most interesting posts and dialogues I’ve heard on the Internet so far. 

John

___________________________

Michael Foucault and Woke Mental Illness

James Lindsay (9/11/26)

Surely you have noticed a couple of things about Woke. First, it acts like mental illness. Second, it actually valorizes mental illness for real. These outcomes are the logical consequence of having adopted the views of the postmodernist Michel Foucault, particularly his early work in Madness and Civilization (1961). Among the consequences to this civilizational catastrophe, besides the obvious, including the transgender ideological craze, is the complete destruction of anything like a “reasonable person” standard by which to judge things we see happening in the world. In this episode of New Discourses Bullets, host James Lindsay explains this intellectual history and its relevance to so much of what we deal with today.

Michel Foucault and Woke Mental Illness

___________________________

I thought about all of what he said above. James Lindsay creating some very interesting  one of those true moments of reflection on something away from al the distraction of culture today. 

I compose the question in the below text. My AI agent considers the below question I asked and lets me see its inside thinking on all of my AI agent.

We need answer. User asks: “What about unreason that results in murder and hurting people?” They refer to Foucault Madness and Civilization. Need discuss. Need likely explain Foucault doesn’t deny violence; but challenges framing. Need maybe distinguish unreason, madness, dangerousness, crime, psychiatry, law, moral treatment, confinement. We need answer likely: Foucault’s critique not romanticizing madness or saying all unreason harmless. The question: What about unreason that results in murder and hurting people? Need address: In M&C, Foucault discusses cases? There is discussion of “madness” and crime? He mentions in Renaissance, madness linked to death, crime? In classical age, confinement includes mad, criminals? Actually Hôpital Général included poor, vagabonds, prostitutes, blasphemers, etc. Not necessarily murderers. The “mad” who were dangerous? Foucault’s argument: psychiatry often justifies confinement by dangerousness, but dangerousness is not self-evident; it’s constructed. Need maybe mention the problem of violent madness is real, but Foucault’s point is about how society responds: Does it treat as medical problem? Does it silence? Does it use power? We should be careful not to dismiss victims. We can say Foucault does not offer a policy for acute violent psychosis; his work is historical-philosophical, not clinical ethics. He would ask: How did we come to define certain violent acts as symptoms of mental illness? What functions does that serve? Does it allow us to avoid listening to the meaning of the act? He might argue that to call it “unreason” and confine is to avoid dialogue. But that doesn’t mean no response is needed. We can discuss tension: If someone is actively dangerous, society must intervene. Foucault’s critique doesn’t say “let them roam.” It says be suspicious of the asylum’s claim to neutral benevolence, and of the equation of madness with danger. The “moral treatment” replaced chains with guilt and surveillance; modern psychiatry/legal system still uses dangerousness to justify coercive power. We can mention “monomania” in 19th century: a diagnosis for homicidal insanity without delirium, used in famous cases like Henriette Cornier? Foucault discusses “monomania” in later lectures? In M&C? I think he mentions “homicidal monomania” maybe in “The Birth of the Asylum” or in “Madness and Civilization” chapter? There’s a section on “The New Division” maybe? Actually Foucault discusses “homicidal monomania” in “Madness and Civilization”? I recall in Part III? He talks about “madness and crime” in the classical age? There is “The Madman in the Garden of Species”? Hmm. In M&C, there is a chapter “The Great Confinement” and “The Birth of the Asylum”. He mentions “the madman is not a criminal” etc. There’s also “The New Division” where he discusses the fear of madness in the 19th century, and “homicidal monomania” as a new category. Yes, in “Madness and Civilization”, chapter “The New Division” maybe: “The crime of the madman” and “monomania” discussed. He says monomania was a way to make madness responsible? Actually let’s recall: In 19th century, psychiatry invented “monomania” (partial insanity) to explain crimes that seemed rational but were insane. This allowed psychiatry to enter legal domain. Foucault’s point: psychiatry expands its power by claiming to detect dangerousness even without visible madness. The madman becomes a permanent threat. The asylum becomes a place to manage dangerousness. This is relevant. So we can answer: Foucault would say the question of violent unreason is exactly where psychiatry’s power is most justified and most dangerous. It is justified because society must protect people. It is dangerous because it can conflate dissent, difference, moral judgment with pathology, and it silences the subject. The task is to maintain tension: take violence seriously, but not let the category of “unreason” become a blank check for coercive control. Need maybe mention that Foucault doesn’t deny the reality of mental suffering or violence. He is not a romantic of madness. In fact, he says in preface? “We have yet to write the history of that other form of madness…” He doesn’t say madmen are wise. He critiques the silence. So we can say: If a person kills due to psychosis, that is a tragedy. Foucault’s analysis doesn’t erase the harm. It asks: What are the conditions under which we respond? Do we respond therapeutically, punitively, both? Who decides? What is the voice of the person? Are we treating them as a subject or an object? The modern system often does both: medical and penal. Foucault’s concept of “disciplinary power” and “biopower” later. In M&C, the asylum is a moral and social institution. The violent act may be real, but the label “unreason” is a social judgment. Need maybe mention that “unreason” in Foucault is not simply “irrational violence.” It’s a historical category. In Renaissance, unreason had a cosmic dimension; in classical age, it was confined with idleness and moral disorder; in modern, it’s mental illness. Violent acts are part of the empirical phenomena, but Foucault’s focus is on the discursive practices that categorize them.

We should structure answer:

• Acknowledge the hard question: real violence, murder, harm. Foucault doesn’t ignore it, but his book isn’t a clinical manual.
• Foucault’s key move: “dangerousness” is not a natural fact but a category used to justify confinement. In 19th century, “homicidal monomania” allowed psychiatry to claim expertise over crimes without obvious delusion. This expanded psychiatric power into law.
• The asylum’s “moral treatment” was about making the madman responsible and guilty, not just protecting others. Pinel/Tuke: chains replaced by shame, surveillance, judgment.
• So Foucault would ask: When we say “unreason that murders,” what are we doing? Are we treating the act as a symptom to be managed, or as a meaningful act to be understood? Are we protecting potential victims? Are we also silencing the person? Are we conflating dangerousness with difference?
• But: Foucault’s critique does not entail that violent psychosis should be ignored or that coercion is never justified. He doesn’t provide a normative theory of when to intervene. Critics say this is a weakness: his radical critique can leave no clear ground for protecting victims or for distinguishing between oppressive confinement and necessary care. We can note that.
• Practical takeaway: A Foucauldian approach would favor minimal coercion, legal safeguards, listening to the subject, treating violence as a problem of the whole person in context, not just an essence called “madness.” It would be suspicious of preventive detention based on psychiatric prediction. It would insist on rights and on not reducing the person to their diagnosis. But it would not deny that some people are dangerous and need containment, sometimes against their will.
• Maybe mention that Foucault later in “The Birth of the Asylum” and lectures “Psychiatric Power” develops these themes. In “Abnormal” lectures, he discusses dangerous individual, criminal psychiatry. But user asked about M&C. We can mention later work.
• We can conclude: The question of violent unreason is the limit case. Foucault forces us to ask not only “how do we protect people?” but also “what kind of power are we authorizing in the name of protection?” Both questions matter.

Need maybe answer directly: “What about unreason that results in murder and hurting people?” Could say: Foucault would not say it’s harmless or romantic. He would say the fact that some madness is violent is precisely what makes the asylum’s power seem necessary. But the book shows that the response to madness has never been purely about safety; it has been about reason’s self-definition, moral judgment, and social exclusion. So we need to separate: (1) the reality of harm, (2) the social construction of dangerousness, (3) the ethics of intervention. Foucault helps with 2 and 3, not 1. He doesn’t offer clinical solutions. He warns against letting the category of unreason become a blank check. But we still need to protect people.

Maybe mention specific historical example: In M&C, Foucault discusses the case of “the madman who killed” maybe? I recall he mentions “the case of the soldier” or “the man who killed his wife”? Not sure. But we can mention “monomania” as the 19th-century invention. Let’s verify: In Madness and Civilization, Part III, chapter 4? “The New Division” maybe. He discusses “homicidal monomania” and the case of Henriette Cornier, a servant who killed a child in 1825. Foucault mentions in “Abnormal” lectures. In M&C, he mentions “the crime of the madman” and “the legend of the chain” maybe. But safe to say: Foucault shows that 19th-century psychiatry invented categories like “homicidal monomania” to claim authority over dangerous individuals who seemed rational. That is relevant.

We should be careful not to overstate Foucault’s view on violence. He doesn’t say violence is just a label. He says the experience of madness is silenced. But he doesn’t deny the reality of the phenomenon. We can say: For Foucault, the problem is not that we respond to violence; it’s how we respond and what we authorize in doing so. He would ask: Does the response restore dialogue and rights, or does it deepen exclusion? Does it treat the person as a subject of a life, or as an object of a diagnosis? Does it protect potential victims without turning psychiatry into a police force? These are hard questions. Foucault doesn’t answer them fully. That’s a fair criticism.

Maybe we can also mention that Foucault’s own position is often accused of relativism or romanticizing madness. But he explicitly says in the preface to the 1961 edition? “We are not trying to write a history of psychiatric knowledge, but the history of the conditions of possibility of that knowledge.” He doesn’t say madmen are right. He says they are silenced. So violent unreason is a limit case that tests his critique. If we take his critique seriously, we must not abandon the need for safety, but we must be vigilant about the power we grant to define and confine.

We can structure:

1. The short answer: Foucault doesn’t deny violent unreason; he shifts the question from “how do we cure/contain it?” to “how did we come to define it, and what power does that definition authorize?”
2. The historical mechanism: dangerousness and monomania. Psychiatry gained power by claiming to detect dangerous madness even in seemingly rational acts. This made the madman a permanent threat.
3. The asylum: moral treatment replaced chains with guilt and surveillance. The violent act becomes proof of need for total control.
4. The ethical tension: real harm vs. social construction. We must protect victims. But we must ask whether coercive psychiatry is the only or best response. Foucault doesn’t give a policy; he gives a critical lens.
5. Criticism: His approach can seem to leave no room for acknowledging genuine danger. That’s a valid critique. A balanced Foucauldian view: take violence seriously, minimize coercion, maximize rights, listen to the person, avoid reducing them to a diagnosis, and be transparent about the power being exercised.

We can also mention that “unreason” in Foucault is not just individual violence; it’s a historical category that includes the mad, the poor, the criminal, the vagabond. So when we ask about murder, we are asking about the edge of that category. The classical age confined them together, not because they were all dangerous, but because they were all “unreasonable” in the sense of not fitting the bourgeois order of labor and reason. So the dangerous madman is a later, more specific figure. That might be useful.

We should keep answer accessible, not too long, but thorough. Desired oververbosity 5. We can write maybe 600-900 words. We can use headings. We should be clear that Foucault’s book is not a denial of violence. We can say: “The question is fair, and it’s the strongest objection to Foucault.” Then explain.

We can also mention that Foucault later in “Discipline and Punish” and “The History of Sexuality” develops power, but in M&C the asylum is a proto-disciplinary institution. The violent madman is the ultimate justification for asylum. But Foucault shows that the asylum also served to impose bourgeois morality. So the answer: We must not let the reality of violence become a justification for unlimited power. But we also cannot ignore it. Foucault helps us see the difference between necessary protection and oppressive confinement. He doesn’t solve it.

Maybe we can quote? “Madness is the absence of work” in classical age? Not necessary. We can quote “The madman is not the man who has lost his reason; he is the man whose reason is not his own” or something? Not sure. Better not quote unless certain. We can paraphrase.

Let’s draft:

Start:

AI Answer to my Question.

That’s the hardest question for Madness and Civilization. Foucault is often read as romanticizing unreason, but he doesn’t deny that some mad people kill or hurt. He denies that “unreason” is a natural medical entity and that the asylum is a neutral response. So if someone murders in psychosis, Foucault would say: the harm is real; the question is what we do with it.

Then: In M&C, the dangerous madman is not the primary figure of the Renaissance or classical confinement. The classical age confined the idle, poor, blasphemous, venereal, etc. The dangerous madman becomes central in the 19th century with “moral treatment” and “monomania.” Psychiatry invented partial insanity to explain crimes that seemed rational. This let doctors say: even if you seem sane, you may be dangerous. That expanded psychiatric power into courts and prisons. So the category “unreason that murders” is historically produced. It is not just discovered.

Then: The asylum response: Pinel and Tuke replaced chains with surveillance, guilt, and judgment. The violent act becomes proof that the madman must be constantly watched. The doctor’s authority is absolute. Foucault’s point: this is not just protection; it is a moral project. It makes the madman responsible for his madness. It silences him.

Then: So what about real violence? Foucault doesn’t offer a clinical ethics. He would ask:

• Is the violence a symptom, a communication, a social situation, or all three?
• What does calling it “unreason” do? Does it protect others, or does it also protect us from listening?
• Who gets to decide dangerousness? How reliable are psychiatric predictions?
• Are we treating the person as a subject with rights, or as an object of security?
• Could we respond with minimal coercion, legal safeguards, and care, rather than permanent exclusion?

Then: Criticism: His critique can seem to leave no room for the obvious fact that some people are dangerous and need containment. That’s a fair objection. Foucault is better at diagnosing power than prescribing policy. A balanced view: take violence seriously, protect victims, but be suspicious of any system that uses “madness” as a blank check for coercion. The goal is not to abolish psychiatry but to make its power visible and accountable.

Then: Conclusion: For Foucault, the violent madman is the limit case that makes the asylum seem necessary. The task is to hold two truths: some unreason is genuinely destructive, and the response to it is never purely medical or neutral. It is always moral, legal, and political. Foucault forces us to ask both “how do we keep people safe?” and “what kind of power are we willing to authorize in the name of safety?” He doesn’t answer the first, but he makes the second unavoidable.

We can also mention that Foucault later in “The Dangerous Individual” (lecture) discusses exactly this. In “Abnormal” lectures, he traces how psychiatry became a science of dangerousness. We can mention that as further reading.

We should ensure we answer the user’s question directly. They ask “What about unreason that results in murder and hurting people?” So we should not just summarize book. We should address the tension. We can say: Foucault would not say it’s not a problem. He would say the problem is not just the act but the way society uses the act to justify confinement and to define reason. But we still need to protect people. So the answer is nuanced.

We can maybe include a caveat: Foucault’s own personal politics? Not needed.

Let’s write in clear, engaging style. Use headings. Maybe 4-5 sections. Keep it around 700-900 words. We can use bullet points. Ensure we don’t overclaim. We can say “Foucault doesn’t deny” but we should be careful: he doesn’t explicitly discuss murder much in M&C? He does discuss monomania. So it’s okay to infer.

Let’s produce final.

* * *

That’s the hardest question to put to Madness and Civilization—and it’s the one that keeps Foucault from being a simple romantic of unreason. Foucault does not deny that some people in states we call madness kill or hurt others. What he denies is that “unreason” is a natural, self-evident medical entity, and that the asylum’s response to it is neutral, benevolent, or purely about safety.

So the short answer is: the harm is real, but the category “unreason that murders” is historical, and the power we authorize in the name of protecting people is the real Foucauldian problem.

The dangerous madman is a relatively late figure

In the Renaissance and classical age, Foucault argues, madness was not primarily defined by dangerousness. The Great Confinement herded together the poor, vagabonds, prostitutes, blasphemers, and the mad—not because they were all violent, but because they were “unreasonable” in the sense of not fitting the bourgeois order of work, reason, and morality.

The figure of the dangerous madman becomes central in the 19th century. Psychiatry invented categories like “homicidal monomania”—a madness that could supposedly produce a terrible crime without any obvious delusion. This allowed doctors to claim expertise over crimes that looked rational. Suddenly, psychiatry could say: You may seem sane, but you are secretly dangerous. That expanded psychiatric power into courts, prisons, and everyday life. Foucault’s point is not that such crimes never happen; it’s that the category was constructed in a way that gave psychiatry enormous authority.

The asylum’s answer: chains replaced by guilt and surveillance

Foucault famously challenges the story that Pinel and Tuke “liberated” the mad by removing their chains. In his account, they replaced iron chains with invisible moral chains: constant observation, judgment, shame, and forced self-surveillance. The violent act became proof that the madman needed total control. The doctor’s authority became absolute. Madness was no longer a cosmic dialogue with unreason; it was a moral failing to be corrected, a disease to be managed, a danger to be contained.

So when someone kills or hurts in a state of unreason, Foucault would ask:

• Is the act being treated as a symptom to be managed, or as a meaningful act to be understood?
• Does calling it “unreason” protect others, or does it also protect us from listening to the person?
• Who gets to decide dangerousness, and how reliable are psychiatric predictions?
• Are we responding with care and legal safeguards, or with permanent exclusion and moral condemnation?

Foucault doesn’t offer a clinical ethics

This is the fair criticism. Madness and Civilization is a history of power and knowledge, not a policy manual for acute psychosis. Foucault is better at showing how the asylum’s power works than at telling us when coercion is justified. He doesn’t say: “Let violent madmen roam free.” He says: Be suspicious of the claim that the asylum is simply protecting you. The asylum also defines reason, enforces morality, and silences the mad.

A balanced Foucauldian view would hold two truths at once:

1. Some unreason is genuinely destructive. Victims matter. Safety matters. Coercion is sometimes necessary.
2. The response to that destruction is never purely medical or neutral. It is always legal, moral, and political. It can protect, but it can also oppress.

Foucault later developed this theme in lectures like Abnormal and Psychiatric Power, where he traces how psychiatry became a science of dangerousness—a way to manage risky individuals before they act. That is the limit case of his critique: the more we justify power by danger, the more we risk turning psychiatry into a police force.

So the answer to your question is not “Foucault ignores violence.” It’s that he forces us to ask both: How do we keep people safe? and What kind of power are we willing to authorize in the name of safety? He doesn’t answer the first. But he makes the second impossible to ignore.